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The academic debate over the lex mercatoria, or medieval Law 
Merchant, including the contemporary incarnation known as the new lex 
mercatoria, has typically been waged between two opposing groups.  
There are the supporters who view the lex mercatoria as an autonomous 
global legal order and evidence of private law-making that is independent 
of any national sovereign.  In their view, this non-state positive law 
emerged from a variety of functionally uniform international commercial 
practices.  In the opposing camp are the critics of the lex mercatoria.  This 
group proclaims the sovereignty of nation states and attacks the lex 
mercatoria as yet another legal fiction. Some have deemed it a phantom 
conjured up by a few French professors.1  The idea of anational law is 
imaginary.  From their most generous perspective, the lex mercatoria has 
at least a minimal link to national law.  The suggestion is that the lex 
mercatoria will never develop into a genuine legal order as it lacks 
sovereign territory and coercive power.  In addition, commercial customs 
and practices are incapable of creating law, as they require transformation 
into law by the formal act of the state.   
This paper will take a position somewhere between these two 
opposing views.  In doing so, I will attempt to transcend the conventional 
scholarly debates surrounding the lex mercatoria.  I will suggest that these 
conventional debates have become increasingly irrelevant.  My reasoning 
is that the ongoing debate, which has so far failed to resolve the dispute 
about the existence of the lex mercatoria, suggests that the disagreement 
has more to do with perspective and legal theory than it has to do with 
historical facts.  The lex mercatoria is at once both non-state law and 
state-based law.  It is not created in the state; it is not created exclusively 
in commerce.  I don’t mean to suggest that it resides in some zone between 
fact and fiction.  But it is created by the law itself.  To borrow a term from 
                                                 
* Visiting Professor and Director of Legal Process, Osgoode Hall Law School. This 
working paper was presented at the Canadian Law and Economics Association, Annual 
Meeting, on September 26-27, 2008, at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
1 Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in Gunther 
Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1997) at 3-28 
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biology, as refashioned by Gunter Teubner,2 the lex mercatoria is 
autopoietic.3  By autopoiesis I mean “auto (self)-creation”.  This is a 
process where a system, such as an organism, a legal system, or a 
corporation, produces its own organization and maintains and constitutes 
itself in a space.4  By “autopoietic” I suggest the lex mercatoria is a type 
of autonomous organism.  As Teubner5 and Ralf Michaels6 have noted, it’s 
a self-contained and self-maintaining legal order.  Thus, the lex mercatoria 
is not so much a body of substantive law, but rather a process whereby it 
organizes and produces itself.  Paradoxically, in this way it’s both 
autonomous and non-autonomous law.   
A small but vocal group of critics insist that the lex mercatoria was 
not a legal order beyond state control.  They typically point out that a 
contract cannot be binding, or enforced, without the legal machinery of the 
state.  In other words, the lex mercatoria lacked autonomy.  Some of these 
scholars have gone as far as to claim that the lex mercatoria was a myth or 
a “modern distortion”.  These arguments revolve around varying concepts 
of autonomy.  Indeed, the word “autonomous” is a term that is used with 
considerable frequency and latitude in discussions about the lex 
mercatoria and other forms of private law-making.  Similarly, the term 
“autonomous” is often used in the literature discussing autopoietic 
systems.  Understanding this word is crucial to our understanding of what 
is meant by an autonomous legal order.   
                                                 
2 Gunter Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in Gunter 
Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1997) at 3.  
3 This is a pseudo-Ancient Greek word, formed through the conjunction of two ancient 
Greek words, “auto” meaning “self”', and “poiesis” meaning (roughly) “creation” or 
“production”.  Poiesis is pronounced “po-E-sis”.  A system is autopoietic if the parts of 
which it is composed interact with each other in such a way as to continually produce and 
maintain those parts and the relationships between them. 
4 For example, a biological cell, a living organism, and to some extent a corporation, and 
a society as a whole. 
5 Teubner, supra note 2.  See also Gunter Teubner, “Breaking Frames: Economic 
Globalization and the Emergence of the lex mercatoria” (2002) 5 European J. of Soc. 
Theory 199. 
6 Ralf Michaels, “The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State” (2007) 14 Indiana J. 
of Glob. Leg. Stud. 447. 




The noun “autonomy” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “1. 
The right of self-government.  2. A self-governing state”.7  Immediately, 
the inadequacy of this definition is apparent.  The self-governing nature of 
the medieval merchant class is evident in the historical record, but this 
group, while free to contract in commercial matters, could not be deemed 
a “government” or a “state”.  Merchants were “autonomous” in terms of 
their relations with each other, as well as in commercial matters with the 
state.  Apart from insisting that it be governed by its own merchant law in 
commercial matters, the merchant class had no other sovereign 
pretentions.  They simply wished to conduct commerce from state to state 
without any interference from local laws.  The Black’s definition is, thus, 
deficient.  It does, however, lead us in another, more interesting direction.  
Under the phrase “autonomy of the parties”, Black’s refers us to “freedom 
of contract”.  There, we find that freedom of contract is a doctrine were 
people enjoy the right to bind themselves legally.  With freedom of 
contract, parties should not be hampered by external control, as from, for 
example, government interference.  In other words, these are legally 
binding acts between individuals outside the direct control of the state.  
This helps us to utilize a functional definition of “autonomous”, at least 
within the context of private legal orders.  I use the term “autonomy” with 
this meaning.  This is from the Greek: “Auto-Nomos”.  “Auto” meaning 
“self”, and “nomos” meaning “law”.  “Autonomy” is, thus, one who gives 
oneself his or her own law, as in self-made law. 
 Based on this definition of “autonomous”, the medieval lex 
mercatoria did represent a distinctive, autonomous, private legal order that 
existed primarily outside the shadow of the state.  What is particularly 
distinctive about this private legal order is the self-regulatory nature of the 
merchant community, especially in the areas of law-creation and dispute 
resolution.  As Harold Berman notes, in the period between 1000 and 
1200, the lex mercatoria evolved out of a set of loose commercial customs 
and into more precise, written rules—rules that were penned into 
commercial instruments.8  During this same period in Europe, the legal 
rights and duties under merchant law became much more uniform in its 
                                                 
7 8th ed., s.v. “autonomy”. 
8 Harold J.Berman, Law and Revolution; The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) at 341. 
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application across state borders.9  This trend towards uniformity was a 
gradual process, and differences in detail remained based on local law and 
custom.  As William Mitchell notes, however, “[e]ach country, it may 
almost be said, each town, had its own variety of the Law Merchant, yet 
all were but varieties of the same species.  Everywhere the leading 
principles and the most important rules were the same, or tended to 
become the same”.10   
While it emerged initially from a set of commercial customs, 
practices and trade usages, the lex mercatoria ultimately evolved into a 
body of law that transcended state borders.  The medieval lex mercatoria 
thus played, and continues to play, a crucial role in international trade, 
particularly in western economies. Indeed, many important rules and 
institutions in contemporary international trade are the results of private 
law-making and private institutions that had their beginnings in the 
medieval lex mercatoria.  One related question to be determined is not 
whether the lex mercatoria existed or continues to exist, but rather to what 
extent do enhanced privatized governance arrangements diminish the 
importance of state-created law in international transactions?  To the 
critics of the lex mercatoria, the development of private legal orders is 
thought to be at the expense of central law planning, state sovereignty, and 
more transparent and democratic forms of governance.  Contrarily, state-
created law is seen as disrupting, and making inefficient, what had been a 
functionally uniform set of customs to regulate supra-local commerce 
outside the framework of the state.  The dialectic on the lex mercatoria 
regularly shifts from these extreme positions. 
For the last millennium, the European merchant class has been 
interested in engaging in business transactions across jurisdictions with 
relative autonomy outside the confines of local state authority.11  With this 
interest—at times a preoccupation—European merchants essentially 
rejected the political and legal authority of individuals or institutions that 
were not a part of this class.  In essence, these merchants believed that 
only members from their own class had the authority to make and enforce 
                                                 
9 Ibid. at 342. 
10 William Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (Clark, NJ: The 
Lawbook Exchange, 2006 reprint ed.) (1904) at 9. 
11 See generally A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 104-107. 




the rules that governed their lives.  The principle of legal autonomy 
eventually evolved into a body of rules.  At the core of the lex mercatoria 
is a set of autonomous commercial customs, which materialize in the form 
of trade usages and commercial practices, including arbitral procedures 
and institutions.  As Berman tells us, the lex mercatoria  
 
governed a special class of people (merchants) in 
special places (fairs, markets, and seaports).  It was 
distinct from local, feudal, royal, and ecclesiastical 
law.  Its special characteristics were that 1) it was 
transnational; 2) its principle source was mercantile 
custom; 3) it was administered not by professional 
judges but by merchants themselves; 4) its procedure 
was speedy and informal; and 5) it stressed equity, in 
the medieval sense of fairness, as an overriding 
principle.12 
 
These characteristics allowed the lex mercatoria to develop outside 
the traditional law-making institutions of the state.  Not surprisingly, it has 
been described as “a uniform system of law to regulate international 
commercial transactions, avoiding the vagaries of differing national 
systems”.13  As Julian Lew notes, “[t]his system of law [the lex 
mercatoria] comprises the rules which have been developed to regulate 
and facilitate international trade relations and the customs and practices 
which have attained universal (or at least very extensive) recognition in 
international trade”.14  Even William Blackstone, writing more than 200 
years ago noted the universal and autonomous character of the Law 
Merchant: 
 
The affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of 
their own called the law Merchant or lex mercatoria, 
                                                 
12 Herold Berman, “The Law of International Commercial Transaction (lex mercatoria)” 
(1988) 2 Emory Int’l L. Rev.235 at 240. 
13 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law & Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 2nd ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 117. 
14 Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1978) at 436. 
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of which all nations agree in and take notice of, and 
it is particularly held to be a part of the law of 
England which decides the cases of merchants by the 
general rules which obtain in all commercial matters 
relating to domestic trade, as for instance, in the 
drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer of Bills of 
Exchange.15 
 
Judge Story would apparently agree with Blackstone.  In the 1842 case of 
Swift v. Tyson, he stated that commercial law “may be truly declared in the 
language of Cicero […] to be in great measure, not the law of a single 
country, but the commercial world”.16 
The quest for predictability and uniformity in the rules of 
international commerce is not a modern phenomenon.  Indeed, the roots of 
modern attempts to create a uniform transnational commercial law can be 
traced back more than 800 years to the beginning of the eleventh century 
when medieval Europe experienced a commercial resurgence that required 
a need for a special law to govern its commercial activities.17  The earliest 
known version, entitled Lex Mercatoria, but more commonly known as 
The Little Red Book of Bristol, has been dated circa 1280.18  This legal 
code is inextricably tied to the marketplace.  Indeed, the Law Merchant 
appears to be a creation of the market itself.  This is what Teubner would 
call a “founding myth”.  The first sentence in the medieval treatise notes: 
“Mercantile law is thought to come from the market, and thus we first 
need to know where markets are held from which such laws derive”.19  
                                                 
15 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I (Portland, 1807) cited 
from Berman, supra note 13 at 342. 
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
17 See Errol P. Mendes, “The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada Transactions; 
Enticing the World’s Largest Trading Bloc to Do Business Under a Global Sales Law” 
(1988) 8 J.L. & Com. 109 available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mendes.html. 
18 Mary Elizabeth Basile et al., eds. & trans., Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism: A 
Late Thirteenth Century Treatise and its Afterlife (Cambridge: The Ames Foundation, 
1998) at 107.  This treatise, written in Latin, formed part of a collection of material 
compiled by William de Colford, the recorder of Bristol in the 1340s.  It is sometimes 
also referred to as The Little Red Book of Bristol. 
19 Ibid. at Ch. 1, p. 1. 




From this statement is the notion that mercantile law evolved from the 
merchant community, and by extension it is independent of local law and 
authority.  In its creation, the Law Merchant appears to be insulated from 
the state.  But how can there a set of legal rules exist outside the state?  As 
law outside the confines of the state, it is argued by some that the lex 
mercatoria is not law.  There is a structural de-coupling between law-
making and the political institutions of the state.  But how can this private 
legal order produce law without the authorization of the state?  This 
introduces the notion of the circularity of the law, as well as an apparent 
paradox.  As merchant law, it is self-created.  In other words, there is no 
true “beginning” point in the lex mercatoria.  This helps to explain 
Teubner’s reference to a “founding myth”.  It came into existence when 
merchants first needed a unique body of rules to govern their affairs.  As 
Berman tells us in a chicken-or-egg manner, the medieval “commercial 
revolution helped to produce commercial law, but commercial law also 
helped to produce the commercial revolution”.20  Perhaps this is why he 
describes the development of the lex mercatoria in terms of “organic 
growth”.21  The lex mercatoria has thus been able to create and perpetuate 
itself as an autonomous system beyond the confines of state-based law. 
This circularity in the origins of the lex mercatoria appears to 
allow parties to contracts to do the impossible: they can create from their 
contracts their own non-contractual foundations.22  Thus, without the 
assistance of the state, merchants’ contracts were able to create their own 
legal order.  As Ralf Michaels notes, the “contract temporalizes itself by 
placing itself between the past of standard terms [or customs] to which it 
refers and the future of adjudication”.23  Teubner would put this in a 
slightly different way.   To him, in an autopoietic legal order, the 
“beginning” is in the middle!24  Teubner may be taking us to the edge 
here, but consider another example in the field of arbitration, known as the 
principle of competence-competence.  The self-created institutions of 
commercial arbitration often have to judge the validity of contracts 
                                                 
20 Berman, supra note 9 at 336. 
21 Ibid. at 354. 
22 Teubner, supra note 2 at 11. 
23 Michaels, supra note 7 at 450.  
24 Ibid.  
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between the parties.  However, the arbitral body’s own validity is based on 
the very same contract, the validity of which it’s to be judging!  Is this not 
unlike “beginning” in the “middle”?  
A 1473 case involving the seizure of goods from a foreign 
merchant records the notion that the lex mercatoria is transnational in its 
application.25  The Chancellor of the Star Chamber asserted that foreign 
merchants must not be judged according to English law, but rather 
according to “the law of nature which by some is called the law merchant, 
which is law universal throughout the world”.26  Gerard Malynes, writing 
in 1622, traces the existence of uniform merchant customs back to ancient 
Greek and biblical times, “[s]o that it plainely appeareth, that the Law 
Merchant, may well be as ancient as any humane Law, and more ancient 
than any written Law”.27  Its precursor may have also been the Sea Law of 
Rhodes28 from ancient Greece, and the Roman jus gentium, which was the 
body of law that governed trade between foreigners and Roman citizens.29  
Eventually, the jus gentium proved to be much more universal in its 
application that Gaius and Justinian could speak of it as “the common law 
of mankind” and “the law in use among all nations”.30  However, during 
Malynes’ time, the lex mercatoria had gained such a foothold in the 
commercial routes of Europe and the Mediterranean that he could declare, 
“[f]or albeit that the government of the said kingdoms and common-
weales doth differ one from another: 1 In the making of lawes and 
ordinances for their owne government […] yet the Law-Merchant hath 
                                                 
25 Basile, supra, note 19 at 128. 
26 Ibid. at 128-129.  The case is Anon. v. Sheriff of London (The Carrier’s Case), YB Eas. 
13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, pl. 5, in Exchequer Chamber Cases, 2:32. 
27 Gerard Malynes, The Merchant’s Almanac of 1622 or Lex Mercatoria, the Ancient 
Law-Merchant (Metheglin Press ed., 1996) (1622) at 5(spelling and grammar in the 
original).  Malynes provides numerous references to ancient commercial laws and 
customs as being uniform among all trading states, from the time of Solon in ancient 
Greece to the publication of his Lex Mercatoria.  He also refers to the trade endeavors of 
Jacob, Joseph, and Moses, as well as Minos, Lycurgus, Phalcas, and others.   
28 Cutler, supra note 12 at 113. 
29 Ana Mercedes Lopez Rodriguez, Lex Mercatoria, RETTID (2002) 46 available at 
http://www.rettid.dk/artikler/20020046.pdf#search='lex%20mercatoria. 
30 Andrew Stephenson, A History of Roman Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1912) at 
197. 




always beene found semper eadem, that is, constant and permanent 
without abrogation, according to her most auncient customes, concurring 
with the law of nations in all countries”.31  Indeed, one of Malynes’ 
themes throughout his work is that a set of ancient commercial customs 
grew into an autonomous and unique body of transnational law, and this 
legal order deals most effectively with merchants’ disputes.   
With the Middle Ages came the rise of independent city-states, 
flourishing seaports, town markets, and boroughs that led to the flow of 
goods across new national borders.32  The merchants not only brought 
goods across borders; they also transported their unique customs and 
practices into foreign markets.  The impetus to create or crystallize rules 
for merchants came from a “desire to overcome the fragmentary and 
obsolete rules of feudal and Roman law”, which were unsuited to the 
needs of international commerce.33  Thus, trading centers began to “reduce 
local practices into regulatory codes” and the laws of particular towns 
eventually “grew into dominant codes of custom” with an international 
flavor.34  Stimulated by the maritime trade of burgeoning seaport towns 
throughout Europe, the lex mercatoria soon acquired its “cosmopolitan 
character and reflected [a retreat] from local law to a universal system of 
law” that transcended sovereigns and national boundaries.35  The end 
result was autonomy, or a new legal order, free from burdensome local 
laws and local legislators.36  In other words, the lex mercatoria became not 
only an autonomous body of commercial law, but also the embodiment of 
commercial practices as reflected in merchant customs.  States Berman: 
“[t]he integrity of the new system of mercantile law, that is, the structural 
coherence of its principles, concepts, rules, and procedures, derived 
mainly from the integrity and structural coherence of the mercantile 
community whose laws it was”.37 
                                                 
31 Malynes, supra note 28 at 5 (grammar, spelling, and italics in the original). 
32 Mendes, supra note 18. 
33 Rodriguez, supra note 30. 
34 Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
Form a New Lex Mercatoria? at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Berman, supra note 9 at 354. 
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A unique feature of the lex mercatoria was that it incorporated the 
customs of commerce, trade fairs, markets, and maritime customs relating 
to trade into law.38  It also had additional features, some of which were not 
unlike the principles adopted by its modern incarnation, such as the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (or CISG), or 
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: it was a 
transnational law; cross-border disputes could be administered by the 
market tribunals of various trade centers, rather than by professional 
judges and state courts; justice was quick and informal; and the law 
stressed equity and fairness, hence, decisions were made on the basis of ex 
aequo et bono.39  These features also describe a self-contained and self-
maintaining legal order.  They also speak in favour of the importance of 
norms and values regarding merchant conduct in trade, and override the 
importance of adherence to a rigid code of state-made law to govern 
international sales transactions.   
The lex mercatoria governed international commerce for an 
extremely long period, until the early seventeenth century.  At this point 
the autonomous mercantile courts began to decline in relative importance 
and the lex mercatoria began to merge with common law.40  The reason 
for this wane is attributed to the rising influence of nationalism and the 
quest for state sovereignty.41  The pace accelerated under the influence of 
Sir Edward Coke, who initiated a comprehensive common law for 
England and the British Empire.42  “During this period, the common law 
courts were given the power to override any decision[s] in the mercantile 
courts”.43  The autopoietic character of the lex mercatoria began to 
dissolve.  Thus, in the case of a dispute, merchants would initiate an action 
with the common law courts and bypass the mercantile courts altogether.  
                                                 
38 Louise Hertwig Hayes, “A Modern Lex Mercatoria: Political Rhetoric or Substantive 
Progress?” (1976-1977) 3 Brook. J. Int’l L. 210 at 212-214. 
39 Baron, supra note 35. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See e.g. Rodriguez, supra note 11 at 46-47.  
42 Mendes, supra note 18.  
43 Ibid. 




Eventually, the mercantile courts became superfluous and fell into disuse.  
Those that remained were eventually abolished by national laws.44 
“The customs and usages of the merchants, while still relevant, 
were deemed not binding in the common law courts”.45  Instead, “they 
were treated as ordinary questions of fact, which had to be proved [in 
each] case to the satisfaction of twelve [civilian] jurors”.46  With the 
blending of the lex mercatoria with the peculiarities of national law, the 
former began to lose much of its uniform and cosmopolitan character.  It 
likely would have faded into oblivion had it not been recognized in the 
mid-eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench.  In the case of Pillans v. Mierop,47 Mansfield held that the rules of 
the lex mercatoria were questions of law to be decided by the courts, not 
issues of fact to be proved by the disputing parties.48  With this ruling, the 
lex mercatoria became “an integral part of the common law”.49 
The nationalization of mercantile law, including international sales 
law, occurred in the nineteenth century.  During this period, states began 
to codify commercial law rules into national legislation.  They decided to 
take full control over international trade and developed new laws to 
regulate all aspects of economic relations between commercial parties.50  
Furthermore, disputes between domestic and foreign parties were to be 
resolved in state courts by referring to private international law.51  The 
emergence of these national laws, and the exclusive state court jurisdiction 
over commercial disputes, marked the demise of the ancient lex 
mercatoria.  The self contained and self-maintaining legal order appeared 
to be dead.  By the end of this era, this autopoietic legal organism 
                                                 
44 See ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Pillans v. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 E.R. 1035 (1765). 
48 Baron, supra note 35. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Imtyaz M. Sattar, “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
and the Vienna Sales Convention: Competing or Completing ‘Lex Mercatoria’?”, (1999) 
4 Int’l Trade & Bus. L. Ann. 13 at 14. 
51 Friedrich K. Juenger, “The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law”, (2000) 60 
La. L. Rev. 1133 at 1136. 
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appeared to have dissolved into an array of domestic legal regimes.  With 
nationalization and codification, a universal, developing, cosmopolitan, 
international commercial law seemed to cease to exist.52 
But by the 1900s, there were already signs that the international 
trade community felt unduly restricted by the array of national legal 
systems governing their cross-border transactions.  As William Mitchell 
remarks, “whenever the private law is splintered into many jurisdictional 
fragments, the need for uniformity shows up most strongly in the field of 
commercial law”.53  The complexity of the rules of private international 
law, and the obsolete character of domestic laws, failed to satisfy the 
business community’s need for simplicity and predictability in cross-
border trade.  In particular, conflict of law rules often produced results that 
appeared arbitrary and impractical.  It also became recognized that 
national laws were primarily enacted to govern domestic transactions and 
often failed to address the unique requirements of international 
transactions.54  The end result was the impairment of global trade.  As 
Lord Justice Kennedy wrote in 1909:  
 
The certainty of enormous gain to civilised [sic] 
mankind from the unification of law needs no 
exposition. Conceive the security and the peace of 
mind of the shipowner [sic], the banker, or the 
merchant who knows that in regard to his 
transactions in a foreign country the law of contract, 
of moveable property, and of civil wrongs is 
practically identical with that of his own country.55 
 
States soon became aware of the negative impact on international 
commerce by a world divided into so many legal systems.  Non-
                                                 
52 Baron, supra note 35. 
53 Mendes, supra note 18, citing W. Mitchell, Essay on the Early History of the Law 
Merchant (1st ed. 1969) at 90. 
54 See e.g. Rodriguez, supra note 30 at 51. 
55 Lord Justice Kennedy, “The Unification of Law”, (1909) 10 J. Soc’y of Comp. Legis. 
21 at 214-15 reprinted in Amy H. Kastely “Unification and Community: A Rhetorical 
Analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention” (1988) 8 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 574 at 
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governmental institutions, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) and its International Court of Arbitration were 
established to address some of the flaws inherent in the national regulation 
of global commerce.56  In 1926, the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”), an independent 
intergovernmental organization, was also founded as an auxiliary organ of 
the League of Nations.  Its objective was to find methods for modernizing 
and harmonizing private international law between states or groups of 
states.57  Following the demise of the League, UNIDROIT was re-
established in 1940 and continues to work towards preparation of modern, 
harmonized uniform rules of private law.58 
THE MODERN LEX MERCATORIA 
 
The establishment of the ICC and UNIDROIT reflected the 
renewed interest in—and rediscovery of—the historical, cosmopolitan 
character of commercial law and the desire on the part of international 
merchants to free themselves from the restrictions of national law.59  
States began to address this dissatisfaction by introducing international 
conventions and model laws in the effort to harmonize private 
international law across borders.60  Considering the various economic, 
social, political, and legal systems of numerous participating states, the 
process was—and continues to be—difficult and time-consuming.  
However, considerable progress has been made, especially in the fields of 
arbitration, factoring, leasing, letters of credit, sale of goods, and contracts.  
These all cover areas of law originally addressed by the medieval lex 
mercatoria.  In the 1960s, academics also began to question the 
                                                 
56 International Chamber of Commerce, Merchants of Peace, The ICC Story available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/id6167/index.html.  
57 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), About 
UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm.  
58 See ibid.  
59 Mendes, supra note 18. 
60 See ibid. 
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effectiveness of national law in international transactions, and they also 
noted the revitalization of the lex mercatoria.61   
As Ana Rodriguez notes, “[j]ust as the medieval merchants 
overcame feudal law, present time traders were adopting alternative 
solutions to avoid the application of national law to their transactions”.62  
With the use of standardized contract clauses, self-governing contracts, 
trade term usages, and recourse to international commercial arbitration, 
merchants began to introduce their own regulatory regime, which operated 
autonomously, as an addendum of national law.63  Indeed, some academics 
have suggested that the new law merchant is simply de-nationalized law.64  
This development has since become known as the new lex mercatoria.  It 
is within the context of this dissatisfaction with national legal regimes, and 
the renaissance of the lex mercatoria, that the modern effort to create a 
uniform transnational commercial law was re-created.65  Or is this just 
another founding myth, or auto self-creation? 
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